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FORECLOSURE DIVERSION AND MEDIATION IN 
THE STATES 
Alan M. White* 
INTRODUCTION 
The recent mortgage foreclosure crisis, whose economic effects 
are well known,1  transformed state legal structures governing the 
mortgage foreclosure process. What had been a relatively routine 
system of default judgments and auction sales has evolved into a 
negotiation and workout practice in which homeowners contest 
foreclosures, demand loan modifications and short sales, and propose 
other alternatives to foreclosures.2 
A profusion of state laws and court orders were adopted between 
2008 and 2014 with the aim of promoting negotiated foreclosure 
alternatives.3 These laws have produced a variety of experiments in 
the “laboratories of democracy.”4 The outcomes of mortgage loan 
																																																																																																																																
*Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law. The author served as co-reporter for the Uniform Law 
Commission drafting committee for the Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act. The author would 
like to thank Deema Azizi and Sarah Lamdan for research assistance, and the participants at the May 
2015 Law, Property and Society conference for their comments. Additional thanks are due to Bill 
Breetz, chair of the Uniform Law Commission committee, Barry Nekritz, the American Bar Association 
advisor, Professor James Smith, my co-reporter, the members of the drafting committee and observers, 
and especially Elizabeth Kent, Heather Kulp and Nancy Rogers for their insights concerning foreclosure 
mediation programs. 
 1. See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE 
WORLD ECONOMY 26 (2010); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: 
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE AND NEXT STEPS 10–11 (2010). 
 2. See Sharon Press, Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation in Florida—Implementation Challenges for 
an Institutionalized Program, 11 NEV. L.J. 306, 310 (2011) (explaining that prior to the crisis 
foreclosure cases were seen as routine and not suitable for mediation); see generally JOHN RAO ET AL., 
NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., FORECLOSURE AND MORTGAGE SERVICING: INCLUDING LOAN 
MODIFICATIONS (5th ed. 2014). 
 3. See infra notes 27, 28, and 31; see also 2012 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 86 (A.B. 278), Ch. 87 (S.B. 
900) (West) (codified in CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.4, .5, .55, .6, .7, 2924.9, .10, .11, .18, .19 (West 
2013)); Perata Mortgage Relief Act, CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2013); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 580.021 (West 2009); Nevada Homeowner Bill of Rights, S.B. 321, 77th Sess. (Nev. 2013) (codified 
in scattered sections of NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 400-560 (2013)); N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. § 1304 
(McKinney 2010); SUP. CT. OF OHIO, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM MODEL 7 (2008), 
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/JCS/disputeResolution/foreclosure/ foreclosureMediation.pdf. 
 4. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“[A] . . . State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without 
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defaults—whether home loans are renegotiated, defaults are cured, or 
homes are sold at auction—have varied tremendously among the 
states.5 We can now begin to assess the desirability of these new laws 
and procedures, and more importantly, identify the foreclosure 
reforms that merit wider adoption. 
One of the most effective legal innovations has been the use of 
mandatory pre-foreclosure mediation, introduced in about half the 
states during this period. The Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures 
Act (UHFPA), approved by the Uniform Law Commission in 2015, 
incorporates permanent provisions for pre-foreclosure mediation in 
all residential mortgage foreclosure cases. 6  The uniform law 
provisions are modeled on the most successful state programs and 
were drafted with the aid of judges, mediators, and attorneys with 
experience in several state foreclosure mediation programs.7 
This article will begin with a brief history of the foreclosure crisis 
and the progressive adoption of foreclosure mediation programs in 
various states. Next, it will summarize the empirical research and 
data measuring the effectiveness of those programs. Both the benefits 
of mediation and the costs, including delay, will be considered and 
compared. The article will then discuss the ways in which foreclosure 
mediation may or may not differ from conventional mediation 
standards embodied in the Uniform Mediation Act, and in particular, 
how and why courts enforce a duty to mediate in good faith. Finally, 
the mediation provisions of the new UHFPA and the case for their 
adoption will be presented. 
I. STATES ADOPTED A VARIETY OF MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION PROGRAMS DURING THE CRISIS 
A. The Foreclosure Crisis Overwhelmed Mortgage Servicers and Led 
																																																																																																																																
risk to the rest of the country.”). 
 5. See Alan M. White & Carolina Reid, Saving Homes? Bankruptcies and Loan Modifications in 
the Foreclosure Crisis, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1713, 1734–36 (2013). 
 6. UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT art. 3 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 7. Id. at i–ii. For access to prior drafts of the act, as well as comments from interested parties, see 
Home Foreclosure Procedures Act, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, http://www.uniformlaws.org/Committee.aspx? 
title=Home+Foreclosure+Procedures+Act (last visited Sep. 18, 2016). 
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to a Variety of Industry and Policy Responses 
Historically unprecedented numbers of mortgages were foreclosed 
between 2007 and 2014.8 Between five and six million homeowners 
were dispossessed via completed foreclosure sales, and perhaps twice 
that many fell behind in payments and were exposed to foreclosure 
threat at one point or another.9 The story of this great foreclosure 
crisis of 2008–2014 includes a story of remarkable variations among 
states in how many homeowners eventually lost homes at foreclosure 
sales and how many of them were able to cure a default and save 
their homes.10 Of all the home mortgages referred for foreclosure 
action, the likelihood of a completed foreclosure sale ranged from 
76% in Arizona to 26% in New York. 11  The story behind these 
variations in foreclosure outcomes is a complex story of legal 
pluralism and industry failures. 
At the onset of the foreclosure crisis, banks bemoaned their 
inability to get homeowners in default to respond to their generous 
offers of loan modifications and other foreclosure alternatives. 12 
Homeowners, it seemed, were like the proverbial ostriches with their 
heads in the sand. Outreach efforts were launched to bring the 
homeowners in from the cold.13 Foreclosure sales, banks told us, 
																																																																																																																																
 8. Author’s calculations using data from HOPE NOW, DATA REPORT: INDUSTRY EXTRAPOLATIONS 
AND HAMP METRICS (May 2015), http://www.hopenow.com/industry-data/HopeNow_Full_Report_ 
Updated_may_2015.pdf (calculations on file with author). The U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development reported as of April 2015 that 4.1 million properties were foreclosed from 2010 to April 
2015 (omitting 2008 and 2009 foreclosures). U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., THE OBAMA 
ADMINISTRATION’S EFFORTS TO STABILIZE THE HOUSING MARKET AND HELP AMERICAN 
HOMEOWNERS 3 (2015). 
 9. HOPE NOW, DATA REPORT: INDUSTRY EXTRAPOLATIONS AND HAMP METRICS 9 (May 2015), 
http://www.hopenow.com/industry-data/HopeNow_Full_Report_Updated_may_2015.pdf. 
 10. See infra Table 1. 
 11. See infra Table 1. 
 12. See, e.g., The Foreclosure Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2008: Hearing on 
H.R. 5679 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th 
Cong. 50–51 (2008) (statement of David G. Kittle, President and Chief Executive Officer, Principle 
Wholesale Lending, Inc., and Chairman-Elect, Mortgage Bankers Association); Id. at 49 (statement of 
Faith Schwartz, Executive Director, HOPE NOW Alliance); Accelerating Loan Modifications, 
Improving Foreclosure Prevention, and Enhancing Enforcement: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. 
Servs., 110th Cong. 43–45 (2007) (statement of Faith Schwartz, Executive Director, HOPE NOW 
Alliance). 
 13. See The Foreclosure Prevention and Sound Mortgage Servicing Act of 2008: Hearing on H.R. 
5679 Before the Subcomm. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., 110th Cong. 
3
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were the worst possible outcome, and everything should be done to 
avoid them.14 
After a few years, industry complaints about those unresponsive 
homeowners faded away. The mortgage servicing industry, starting 
around 2007, was rapidly overwhelmed with homeowners seeking 
loan modifications and other workouts. 15  Homeowners now 
complained about getting no responses from mortgage servicers.16 
Diligent homeowner attorneys uncovered the robo-signing scandal, 
namely the widespread practice of servicers and their legal teams 
using falsified note endorsements, assignments, and affidavits to 
mass-produce foreclosure paperwork. 17  In response, courts and 
regulators demanded that servicers clean up their act, and foreclosure 
cases languished while servicers gave homeowners applying for loan 
modifications and short sales the runaround.18 
Now, as the foreclosure crisis wanes, the banking industry can be 
heard complaining that they are now spending too much time talking 
to homeowners, and that long foreclosure delays resulting from 
homeowners coming in from the cold en masse are just wasting 
everyone’s time and money.19 Foreclosure delays can be traced to 
many causes: capacity limitations of servicers, law firms, courts and 
county sheriffs, banks’ reluctance to sell into an already glutted 
market, federal and state agency enforcement actions in response to 
robo-signing and other servicer misconduct, and some of the state 
laws enacted to ameliorate the foreclosure crisis.20 
																																																																																																																																
49 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 
10,696, 10,700 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1024). 
 16. Id. 
 17. Alan M. White, Losing the Paper—Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer 
Protection, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 468, 469–70 & n.4 (2012). 
 18. David Streitfeld, Backlog of Cases Gives a Reprieve on Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (June 19, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/19/business/19foreclosure.html; see also Lisa Prevost, Upshot 
of the Foreclosure Backlog, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/09/realestate/mortgages-upshot-of-the-foreclosure-backlog.html. 
 19. See Easthampton Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 21 N.E.3d 922 (Mass. 2014) (bank 
challenging local ordinance establishing foreclosure mediation program); State-Level Guarantee Fee 
Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. 58,991, 58,991 (Sept. 25, 2012) (citing high costs occasioned by lengthy 
foreclosure timelines). 
 20. See White, supra note 17, at 469–70 & n.4; Mary Ellen Podmolik, New Rules to Govern Illinois 
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The federal government’s response to the foreclosure crisis relied 
primarily on incentives for voluntary action by mortgage servicers to 
reduce or mitigate foreclosure sales via the Home Affordable 
Modification Program (HAMP). 21  The Federal Housing Finance 
Agency (FHFA), the de facto manager of the nationalized mortgage 
funders Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, had the power to tell servicers 
to rewrite loans, but the Treasury Department and FHFA have been 
ambivalent at best about loan modifications, and whether to 
encourage or discourage speedy foreclosure sales.22 
While the federal government tacked and dithered, the states 
adopted a myriad of laws, regulations, and court orders to encourage 
workouts and minimize foreclosure sales, as well as to deal with 
abandoned properties in foreclosure. Literally hundreds of laws were 
adopted by the states between 2007 and 2013 modifying the 
foreclosure process in various ways: to encourage negotiated 
alternatives to foreclosure sales, to address responsibility for 
abandoned properties, to reduce redemption periods, and to protect 
tenants in foreclosed homes, among other issues.23 
																																																																																																																																
Foreclosures, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 22, 2013), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2013-02-22/business/ct-biz-
0222-mortgage-rules—20130222_1_illinois-foreclosures-mortgage-servicers-foreclosure-process; 
Marcie Geffner, What Delays a Mortgage Foreclosure, YAHOO! FIN. (Jan. 19, 2011), 
finance.yahoo.com/news/What-delays-a-mortgage-brn-1797356472.html. 
 21. Jean Braucher, Humpty Dumpty and the Foreclosure Crisis: Lessons from the Lackluster First 
Year of the Home Affordable Modification Program (HAMP), 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 727, 729 (2010); Dan 
Immergluck, Too Little, Too Late, and Too Timid: The Federal Response to the Foreclosure Crisis at 
the Five-Year Mark, 23 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 199, 199 (2013). 
 22. See SHEILA BAIR, BULL BY THE HORNS: FIGHTING TO SAVE MAIN STREET FROM WALL STREET 
AND WALL STREET FROM ITSELF 147–50 (2012); Immergluck, supra note 21, at 200; Nick Timiraos, An 
Accidental Housing Chief Embraces the Power of “No,” WALL ST. J. (Aug. 31, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111904199404576538803284685440. 
 23. See Memorandum from the Unif. Law Comm’n Staff to Bill Breetz, Chairman of the Study 
Comm. on Mortg. Foreclosure (May 16, 2012), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage% 
20foreclosure/9_2012may16_RREMFPP_Legislation%20Survey%20and%20Introductory%20Memo_
ULC%20Staff.pdf; Survey Statistics, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/2012apr11_RREMFPP_Survey%20
stats.pdf. 
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B. Nearly Half the States Tried Some Form of Foreclosure Mediation 
or Settlement Conference Program 
Among these new foreclosure laws were an array of mediation and 
settlement conference programs, both in judicial and nonjudicial 
foreclosure states. 24  While these programs have been a factor in 
slowing foreclosures,25 foreclosure mediation has also had a clear 
record of success, both in getting homeowners to better communicate 
with mortgage servicers, and in producing default cures, voluntary 
sales, and other beneficial alternatives to foreclosure auctions.26 
Seventeen states adopted statewide foreclosure mediation 
programs after 2008. Thirteen statewide programs were established 
by statute,27 and the other four were implemented via court rule or 
other court or agency initiative.28 At least eight other states have 
established local or county court mediation programs in some parts of 
their states, without statewide legislation or court action. 29  Other 
states, notably California, have eschewed mediation and instead 
enacted “meet-and-confer” statutes.30  These laws require a 30- to 
																																																																																																																																
 24. See infra notes 27, 28. 
 25. See infra Part III B. 
 26. See infra Part II. 
 27. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-31m to -31n (West 2013); D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 26, § 2700.1 
(2014); HAW. REV. STAT § 667-73 (2012); IND. CODE § 32-30-10.5-1 (2009); IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 654.4B (West 2016); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 14, § 6321-A (2016); MD. CODE. ANN., REAL PROP. § 7-
105.1 (West 2014); MICH. COMP. LAWS SERV. §§ 600.3205e to .3206a) (LexisNexis 2013) (repealed 
2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.086 (LexisNexis 2009) (repealed, effective July 1, 2017); N.Y. 
C.P.L.R. 3408 (McKinney 2009) (effective Dec. 20, 2016); OR. REV. STAT. § 86.726 (2009); VT. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 12, §§ 4631-4633 (2015); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.163 (West 2016). 
 28. Automatic Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Mediation Program, No. 2012-2 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Jan. 13, 2012); In Re Final Report and Recommendations on Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, 
No. AOSC09-54 (Fla. Dec. 28, 2009) (rescinded in part by In Re Managed Mediation Program for 
Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, No. AOSC11-44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011)); Residential Mortgage 
Foreclosure Mediation Program—Rule Relaxation Order (N.J. Nov. 17, 2008); SUP. CT. OF OHIO, 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM MODEL (Apr. 14, 2008), http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ 
JCS/disputeResolution/foreclosure/foreclosureMediation.pdf. 
 29. BOSTON, MASS., ORDINANCE 1592 (Dec. 14, 2010); PROVIDENCE, R.I., CODE §§ 13-213 to -218 
(2008); Order of the Jefferson Circuit Court (Ky. Cir. Ct. 30th Mar. 30, 2009); In re a Foreclosure 
Mediation ADR Option, No. 2009-00001 (N.M. Dist. Ct. 1st July 8, 2009); Residential Mortgage 
Foreclosure Diversion Pilot Program, No. 2008-01, (Phila. Dist. Ct. 1st Apr. 16, 2008); Podmolik, supra 
note 20; Foreclosure Mitigation Counseling, DOUGLAS CTY. HOUS. P’SHIP, 
http://douglascountyhousingpartnership.org/ 
foreclosure-mitigation-counseling/ (last visited Aug. 17, 2016); WIS. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 
NETWORK, http://www.mediatewisconsin.com (last visited Aug. 17, 2016). 
 30. HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, RESOL. SYS. INST., FORECLOSURE DISPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM 
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150-day delay before nonjudicial foreclosure, during which the 
servicer must attempt to contact the borrower and offer foreclosure 
alternatives, but do not provide a neutral third party to facilitate the 
negotiation.31 
Sunset provisions are common in the state statutes, presumably 
based on the expectation that foreclosures will return to normal levels 
as the crisis wanes. For example, Connecticut’s law sunsets on July 
1, 2019,32 and New York’s on February 13, 2020.33 Maine’s law 
required a report and review by 2013.34 States where outcomes data 
were collected and reported have generally found their programs 
successful and chosen to extend them.35 On the other hand, mediation 
bills were not adopted in many states,36 and banks have successfully 
challenged the right of some local governments to adopt mediation 
programs on the grounds that they conflict with state law or exceed 
local government authority.37 
The various state and local mediation programs are by no means 
uniform. Homeowners must usually make an affirmative request for 
mediation (opt-in), but in a few programs the initial meeting is 
scheduled automatically (opt-out).38 Some require the homeowner to 
																																																																																																																																
MODELS STATE-BY-STATE 84 (2012), http://www.aboutrsi.org/pfimages/ForeclosureMediation 
ProgramModels_ September2012.pdf. 
 31. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2923.5 (West 2013) (original sunset date January 1, 2013, extended to January 
1, 2018); CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 2923.52 to .53 (Dearing 2009) (repealed Jan. 1, 2011) (sunsets January 1, 
2011); see Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 244, § 35A (2016). 
 32. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-31n (West 2016). 
 33. N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3408 (Consol. 2016); 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 507, § 25(e) (McKinney). 
 34. GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., REBUILDING AMERICA: HOW STATES CAN SAVE 
MILLIONS OF HOMES THROUGH FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 41 (2012) (table with sunset dates). 
 35. KULP, supra note 30, at 101; Michelle Tuccitto Sullo, With Thousands of Foreclosures Pending, 
State Extends Mediation Program, CT. LAW TRIB. (July 9, 2015), http://www.ctlawtribune.com/ 
id=1202731764319/With-Thousands-of-Foreclosures-Pending-State-Extends-Mediation-
Program?mcode=0&curindex=0. 
 36. E.g., H.B. 2739, 49th Leg., 2d Sess. (Ariz. 2010); H.B. 1649, 186th Gen. Court, Reg. Sess. 
(Mass. 2009). 
 37. Mo. Bankers Ass’n v. St. Louis County, 448 S.W.3d 267, 272 (Mo. 2014); see also Easthampton 
Sav. Bank v. City of Springfield, 21 N.E.3d 922, 932 (Mass. 2014) (invalidating a municipal foreclosure 
mediation ordinance); Virginia Young, Missouri Legislature Moves to Drop Mediation for Foreclosed 
Homeowners, ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (May 6, 2013), http://www.stltoday.com/news/local/govt-and-
politics/missouri-legislature-moves-to-drop-mediation-for-foreclosed-homeowners/article_78d21a3d-
daff-5d42-9ccf-3daa56a408d5.html. 
 38. See U.S. DEP’T. OF JUSTICE & U.S. DEP’T. OF HOUS. AND URBAN DEV., EMERGING STRATEGIES 
FOR EFFECTIVE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS 4 (2010) [hereinafter EMERGING STRATEGIES]; 
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meet with a housing counselor before mediation, and most have 
detailed lists of documents and information that the homeowner and 
mortgage servicer must submit to the mediator. 39  The mortgage 
servicer must send someone to participate in person in some states, 
while others permit telephone conference sessions.40 The degree of 
data reporting and court oversight also varies from state to state.41 
Despite these variations, the defining feature of mediation or 
foreclosure diversion programs is the same: the presence of a neutral 
individual to facilitate communication between homeowner and 
servicer, together with a pause in the foreclosure process.42 
The varied mediation programs launched during the foreclosure 
crisis have produced a wealth of data to evaluate their effectiveness. 
Several states have incorporated detailed data collection as part of 
their program to facilitate empirical studies of the outcomes.43 States 
adopting mediation programs have tended to be those with the most 
severe foreclosure rates. As of June 30, 2009, the ten states with the 
highest foreclosure inventory rates were Florida, Nevada, Arizona, 
California, New Jersey, Illinois, Ohio, Indiana, Maine, and 
Michigan.44 Of these, Arizona and California were the only states not 
to implement some type of mediation program; Illinois had programs 
only in a few counties.45 With five years of data and large numbers of 
foreclosures, we have reached the point when we can usefully 
examine the results of this legal experiment, and compare foreclosure 
outcomes between states with mediation programs and those without 
them.46 
																																																																																																																																
see generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 39. EMERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 5, 7. 
 40. See generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 41. Id. 
 42. EMERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 3. 
 43. See infra notes 43–51. 
 44. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY 3 (2009). 
 45. See KULP, supra note 30, at 6–7. 
 46. White & Reid, supra note 5, at 1713. 
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II. EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE SHOWS THAT MEDIATION AND SETTLEMENT 
PROGRAMS IMPROVE FORECLOSURE OUTCOMES 
The available research uniformly supports the effectiveness of 
foreclosure mediation in achieving loan modifications and other 
resolutions that avoid the need for foreclosure sales.47 Several state 
court systems have compiled statistics regarding their mediation 
programs. 48  Typically, these compilations tally the number of 
homeowners who elect or appear at mediation or settlement 
conferences, and sometimes the number and percentage of cases that 
are settled prior to judgment and foreclosure sale.49 A few carefully 
designed empirical studies have confirmed the significant positive 
impact of mediation.50 Finally, my own calculations from publicly 
available mortgage performance data are strongly suggestive that 
states with foreclosure mediation have better foreclosure outcomes.51 
A. State Data Show High Homeowner Participation Rates and 
Successful Mediation Outcomes 
Some state legislatures and court administrators who adopted 
foreclosure mediation wisely chose to incorporate data reporting 
from the beginning, making it possible to evaluate rigorously the 
impact of the programs. 52  Connecticut, for example, has each 
mediator prepare detailed reports on each case, which are then 
compiled and tabulated to allow evaluation of the program’s success 
or failure. 53  The Ohio courts’ model for mediation programs 
																																																																																																																																
 47. See id. at 1723. 
 48. See generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 49. STATE OF NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, FY 2013 ANNUAL REPORT 5 (2013) 
[hereinafter NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2013]. 
 50. Memorandum from Alan White to the Unif. Law Comm’n Comm. on Home Foreclosure 
Procedures Act, State Foreclosure Mediation Laws: Examples and Research for a Uniform Statute 3 
(May 11, 2012), http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/mortgage%20foreclosure/4_2012may11_ 
RREMFFP_State%20Foreclosure%20Mediation%20Laws%20memo_White.pdf [hereinafter State 
Foreclosure Mediation Laws Memo]. 
 51. See discussion infra Section II.C. 
 52. Sullo, supra note 35. 
 53. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 49-31n(b)(2), (d)(1) (2016). 
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recommends the use of standardized outcome reporting forms. 54 
Nevada also collects detailed information from its mediators.55 
The Connecticut program reports that about 70% of all defendants 
in mortgage foreclosure cases appeared at automatically scheduled 
conferences.56 Of those who appeared, 64% remained in their homes, 
15% negotiated a “graceful exit” such as a short sale, and 21% went 
to foreclosure sale.57 New York’s courts report that default judgments 
against homeowners have declined to 10%, meaning 90% of eligible 
homeowners are participating in mediation. 58  Other states report 
similar outcomes: high participation rates, and high rates of 
successful negotiation for participants. 59  Mediation has thus been 
highly successful as a means to get homeowners to respond and 
participate in loss mitigation and foreclosure prevention. 
Nevada, a nonjudicial foreclosure state, reports much lower 
participation rates and lower home retention outcomes resulting from 
mediation.60 Nevada reported 1,894 mediations in fiscal year 2014, 
resulting in 503 agreements, and also 319 foreclosures prevented 
because the servicer did not bring required proof of its right to 
foreclose.61  Of the agreements, 274 contemplated home retention, 
																																																																																																																																
 54. Jacqueline C. Hagerott, Foreclosure Mediation: Responding to the Current Crisis, 40 CAP. U. L. 
REV. 899, 909–10 (2012). 
 55. STATE OF NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, FY 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2014) 
[hereinafter NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2014]. 
 56. EMERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 4. 
 57. The Connecticut courts’ data are summarized in a Boston Federal Reserve staff report. ROBERT 
CLIFFORD, NEW ENGLAND PUB. POLICY CTR., STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION EFFORTS IN NEW 
ENGLAND: MEDIATION AND ASSISTANCE 12 (2011), 
https://www.bostonfed.org/economic/neppc/researchreports/2011/neppcrr1103.pdf. 
 58. STATE OF N.Y. UNIFIED COURT SYS., 2011 REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE 
COURTS 4 (2011), http://www.courts.state.ny.us/publications/pdfs/ForeclosuresReportNov2011.pdf 
[hereinafter N.Y. COURTS REPORT]. 
 59. CLIFFORD, supra note 57, at 10; see also DEL. ATTORNEY GEN., DELAWARE AUTOMATIC 
RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE MEDIATION: OVERALL PARTICIPATION AS OF 2ND QUARTER 
2015 (2015), http://attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/fraud/cpu/automediation.shtml (under “Mortgage 
Foreclosure Data,” select “2015”; then follow “Second Quarter 2015 Mediation Program Participation 
Overview” hyperlink) (reporting about 50% participation, and 50% success for participants); The 
Mortgage Foreclosure Task Force and Settlement Conference Statistics, COURTS.IN.GOV, 
http://www.in.gov/judiciary/admin/2364.htm (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) (reporting about 50% 
participation by eligible borrowers, and for participants, about 50% successful workouts). 
 60. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2014, supra note 55, at 1–3. 
 61. Id. at 2. 
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while in 229 instances the home was to be sold or surrendered.62 
During the same period, 13,040 foreclosures were permitted to 
proceed, either because the homes were not owner-occupied, the 
homeowner did not request mediation, or mediation failed.63 Lower 
home retention is not entirely surprising given some unique features 
of the Nevada housing market.64 Investor-owned properties account 
for an unusually large share of Nevada foreclosures; in fiscal year 
2013 for example, 9,482 foreclosures were allowed to proceed 
because they were not eligible for mediation—not owner-occupied—
compared with 2,752 requests for mediation received in the same 
period.65 
Servicer noncompliance accounted for roughly half of the failed 
mediations in Nevada.66 For example, in fiscal year 2013, about two-
thirds of mediations did not result in an agreement.67 According to 
mediator reports, in 41% of the Nevada cases with no agreement, the 
lender failed to appear, had no authority, did not produce documents, 
or failed to negotiate in good faith.68 
Court reports and other research also consistently show that 
automatic or “opt-out” foreclosure mediation results in much higher 
participation than an on-request or “opt-in” program. 69  Opt-out 
programs with automatically scheduled mediations, such as New 
York, have participation rates of 70% or more, while opt-in states 
typically report participation rates of 25% or lower.70 Data reports 
from the various states reveal that participation in mediation is 
impacted by the form of notice of mediation and whether the 
																																																																																																																																
 62. Id. at 2–3. 
 63. Id. at 3. 
 64. See Jennifer Rachel Baumer, Nevada’s Residential Housing Market, NEV. BUS. (Nov. 1, 2015), 
http://www.nevadabusiness.com/2015/11/nevadas-residential-housing-market/. 
 65. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2013, supra note 49, at 1, 6. 
 66. Id. at 2. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Andrea Kupfer Schneider & Natalie C. Fleury, There’s No Place Like Home: Applying Dispute 
Systems Design Theory to Create a Foreclosure Mediation System, 11 NEV. L.J. 368, 372 (2011) (noting 
that 17% to 20% of defendants in Milwaukee’s opt-in program request mediation); State Foreclosure 
Mediation Laws Memo, supra note 50, at 3. 
 70. EMERGING STRATEGIES, supra note 38, at 4. 
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mediation is automatically scheduled or held on request only.71 The 
reports also reveal that significant numbers of mediation participants 
are able to negotiate an alternative to a foreclosure sale.72 
B. Studies Comparing Foreclosure Cases with and Without 
Mediation Also Show Mediation Improves Outcomes 
The state tabulations offer simple descriptive statistics on 
participation and outcomes. 73  They do not attempt to evaluate 
whether the outcomes would have been different in the absence of 
mediation.74 In other words, some might argue that homeowners who 
opt in to mediation and achieve a workout might also have persisted 
and achieved the same result even without mediation. 75  Three 
empirical studies have tested the causal impact mediation has on 
foreclosure outcomes, using either a before-and-after comparison, a 
comparison between jurisdictions with and without mediation, or a 
set of variables to control for differences between participants and 
non-participants.76 
Philadelphia’s Reinvestment Fund study found that 70% of 
eligible homeowners appeared at mandatory mediation conferences, 
and of those, 35% achieved a settlement to remain in their home.77 
Comparing foreclosures before and after the mediation program 
implementation, the rate at which homes went to sale was cut in 
half.78 The results appeared to be lasting: 80% of homeowners with 
mediated agreements were still in their homes almost two years 
later.79 
																																																																																																																																
 71. State Foreclosure Mediation Laws Memo, supra note 50, at 3. 
 72. Id. 
 73. See infra Table 1. 
 74. See infra Table 1. 
 75. GEOFFRY WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL MEDIATION PROGRAMS: 
CAN THEY SAVE HOMES? 12 (2009). 
 76. See infra notes 78–80, 81–84, and 85–91. 
 77. THE REINVESTMENT FUND, PHILADELPHIA RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE DIVERSION 
PROGRAM: INITIAL REPORT OF FINDINGS 23 (2011), https://www.reinvestment.com/wp-
content/uploads/2015/12/Foreclosure_Diversion_Initial_Report-Report_2011.pdf. The research was 
funded by the William Penn Foundation and the Open Society Institute. Id. 
 78. See id. 
 79. Id. at 4. 
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Collins and Urban studied the mandatory mediation programs in 
three Florida judicial districts: Pensacola, Miami, and Daytona. 80 
Controlling for a variety of factors, they found that mortgage 
modifications were significantly higher in localities with mediation 
programs than in those without.81 They also found that re-defaults on 
modified loans were lower in areas with mediation programs after the 
programs were adopted.82 They theorized that this resulted primarily 
from better information exchange between the homeowner and the 
mortgage servicer.83 
The Connecticut State Justice Initiative evaluated the Connecticut 
statewide mediation program in a 2014 report.84 Connecticut was the 
first state to adopt a statewide program, and had 31,000 participants 
out of 124,000 judicial foreclosures filed between 2008 and 2013.85 
The report estimates that the participants represented about one-third 
of eligible homeowners, excluding foreclosures on vacant and 
investor-owned properties. 86  Participants included all homeowners 
who requested mediation and attended an initial meeting. 87  For 
concluded mediations, 68% avoided a foreclosure, and roughly 50% 
achieved a home retention outcome. 88  The 32% of mediation 
participants whose homes went to foreclosure sale contrasts with the 
typical 58% of all foreclosure filings. 89  Using a multivariate 
regression model to compare participants and non-participants while 
accounting for other available variables, the study found that 
mediation participation reduced the likelihood of a foreclosure 
proceeding to judgment—a major step towards a completed sale—by 
																																																																																																																																
 80. J. Michael Collins & Carly Urban, Mandatory Mediation and the Renegotiation of Mortgage 
Contracts, 125 ECON. J. 1734, 1739–40 (2015). 
 81. Id. at 1742, 1747. 
 82. Id. at 1736, 1738, 1754. 
 83. Id. at 1739. 
 84. GLORIA JEAN GONG & CARL BRINTON, CONNECTICUT JUDICIAL BRANCH MORTGAGE 
FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM EVALUATION 4 (2014), 
http://www.jud.state.ct.us/statistics/FMP/sji_eval.pdf. 
 85. Id. at 5, 7. 
 86. Id. at 16. 
 87. Id. at 15. 
 88. Id. at 25. 
 89. Id. at 25. 
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13%.90 Thus, all three empirical studies found that mediation reduced 
the number of foreclosure sales and increased the number of 
successfully negotiated outcomes.91 
C. Available Data on Subprime Mortgage Foreclosure Outcomes 
Shows Fewer Foreclosure Sales, More Loan Modifications and More 
Default Cures in States with Effective Mediation Programs 
This section contains a summary of my own findings based on 
tabulations of publicly available mortgage data.92  These data also 
support the hypothesis that states with well-designed foreclosure 
mediation programs reduce the number of homes facing foreclosure 
that are eventually auctioned at foreclosure sales, and increase the 
number of successful alternatives. 
The Wells Fargo Corporate Trustee Services (“CTS”) data file 
contains records of subprime and alt-A mortgages that are purchased 
by private-label mortgage securitizations.93 Using the 2000 through 
2006 mortgage origination files, I constructed a set of 4 million 
mortgage records. The data are updated monthly with variables 
reflecting current loan performance, including the date of the last 
payment, the foreclosure status, and whether the mortgage has been 
modified. 
I created a sample consisting only of mortgages identified as 
first-lien loans, containing 3,187,955 records. By compiling monthly 
files from December 2006 through December 2013, I calculated 
additional variables reflecting the final outcome: completed 
foreclosure sale, loan current, loan active but delinquent, loan prepaid 
in full, or outcome missing. The outcome-missing cases are those 
where the loan record ceases to appear in monthly reports some time 
prior to December 2013, and never appeared as paid in full or 
																																																																																																																																
 90. GONG & BRINTON, supra note 84, at 37. 
 91. Id. at 33; Collins & Urban, supra note 80, at 1736–37; see THE REINVESTMENT FUND, supra note 
77, at 15. 
 92. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 93. For descriptions of this dataset, see White & Reid, supra note 5, at 1723; J. Michael Collins & 
Maximilian Schmeiser, The Effects of Foreclosure Counseling for Distressed Homeowners, 32 J. POL’Y 
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 83, 86–87 (2013). 
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foreclosed in any prior report. For example, a loan record might 
reflect that the payments are current in March 2010, but not prepaid, 
and the same loan does not appear in any monthly files from April 
2010 forward. This could occur if servicing is transferred or the loan 
was sold, such that the investor reporting ceases to be submitted to 
Wells Fargo CTS. 
Of the 3.2 million loans, 828,858 entered foreclosure at some point 
between 2007 and 2013. This subset of records is the dataset I have 
used to examine the possible effect of mediation programs and other 
differences in foreclosure processes on outcomes. This sample 
selection means that I cannot capture the differences that state 
mediation programs or other state foreclosure laws might have on the 
initial servicer decision to refer a defaulted loan to foreclosure. 
Nevertheless, it seems reasonable to examine outcome variability in a 
population of mortgage loans, which all initially entered the 
foreclosure process. 
The home loss rate varies tremendously among the states.94 The 
percentage of homes beginning foreclosure that ultimately went to a 
foreclosure sale ranged from 26% in New York, to 67% in 
California, and 75% in Arizona.95 Nonjudicial foreclosure states like 
California, Arizona, Nevada, and Michigan had very high rates of 
foreclosures going to sale.96 While many mortgage loans in slower 
foreclosure states like New York remain unresolved and in default at 
the end of the study period, states with lower completed sale rates 
also have much higher cure rates.97 In New York, 30% of mortgage 
loans having entered foreclosure at some point between 2007 and 
2013 were current at December 2013, compared with only 5% in 
Michigan, and 6% in Arizona.98 While economic factors, such as 
unemployment and home price appreciation, also vary among the 
																																																																																																																																
 94. See infra Table 1. 
 95. See infra Table 1. 
 96. See infra Table 1; see also Stephen Elias, Nonjudicial Foreclosures, NOLO, 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/how-foreclosure-works-30066-2.html (last visited Nov. 3, 
2016) (listing states using nonjudicial foreclosure). 
 97. See infra Table 1. 
 98. See infra Table 1. 
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states,99 it is reasonable to assume that some of the huge variation in 
foreclosure outcomes relates to variations in foreclosure laws and 
practices. 
One important factor differentiating states with high home loss 
rates is the rate at which mortgages in the foreclosure process are 
renegotiated with a permanent loan modification.100 In Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, New York, and Maryland, 23% to 25% of all 
mortgages entering foreclosure were modified at some point.101 Each 
of these are judicial foreclosure states that implemented mediation 
early. 102  The states with the lowest modification rates included 
California (15.5%), Arizona (14.8%), Florida (14%), Michigan 
(13.5%), and Nevada (12.5%).103 All the latter states except Florida 
are nonjudicial foreclosure states.104 Florida, Michigan, and Nevada 
implemented mediation programs, 105  while Arizona has not. 106 
Nevada has experienced comparatively low participation rates in its 
program.107 Florida terminated its statewide mediation program in 
2011, although some counties continued to operate them, 108  and 
Michigan allowed its program to sunset in 2014.109 
This simple descriptive analysis of state foreclosure outcomes does 
not account for any variables other than mediation. Foreclosure 
																																																																																																																																
 99. Erin Carlyle, Best Buy Cities: Where to Invest in Housing in 2016, FORBES (Jan. 27, 2016, 10:00 
AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/erincarlyle/2016/01/27/best-buy-cities-where-to-invest-in-housing-
in-2016/#5ef5192b2429. 
 100. See White & Reid, supra note 5, at 1718–19 (describing loan modifications in the context of the 
2008 foreclosure crisis). 
 101. See infra Table 2. 
 102. See infra Table 2. 
 103. See infra Table 2. 
 104. Elias, supra note 96. 
 105. GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., STATE AND LOCAL FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 
PROGRAMS 1–3 (2010), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/report-state-
mediation-programs-update.pdf. 
 106. Art Hinshaw & Timothy Burr, Foreclosure Mediation in Arizona, 45 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 749, 754 
(2013). 
 107. NATIONAL DELINQUENCY SURVEY, supra note 44, at 3; KULP, supra note 30, at 8. 
 108. In Re Managed Mediation Program for Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Cases, No. AOSC11-
44 (Fla. Dec. 19, 2011); In Re Mortgage Foreclosure Procedures Update, No. 2015-015 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 6th 
Mar. 12, 2015); Order Governing Residential Foreclosure Mediation Procedures, Orange County, No. 
2012-06 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 9th Apr. 12, 2012). 
 109. 2014 Mich. Pub. Acts 125 (enacting section 1, repealing MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.3205e 
(2014)). 
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timelines, home price changes, and other state-specific factors likely 
explain much of the interstate differences in completed foreclosure 
sales. A few states with mediation programs, notably Ohio and 
Indiana, had relatively high sale rates and low cure and modification 
rates.110 Still, the fact that New York homeowners in default had five 
times as many cures as those in Arizona, nearly twice as many 
modifications, and one-third the rate of completed foreclosure sales, 
tells us something about New York’s aggressive foreclosure 
mediation program.111 Further research in this area should include 
multivariate modeling to exploit the available nationwide mortgage 
performance data and test the independent effect that mediation 
program implementation has on foreclosure outcomes. These 
descriptive data are consistent with the results of prior empirical 
studies concluding that mediation reduces foreclosure sales and helps 
achieve better outcomes.112 
D. The Economic and Other Benefits of Foreclosure Sale Avoidance 
Are Substantial 
Preventing a foreclosure sale saves money. 113  Homes sold at 
foreclosure auctions are sold at a large discount from market value, 
and the costs of the foreclosure process add to the loss. 114  The 
deadweight losses from home foreclosure sales can amount to 
$100,000 or more.115 Mortgage servicers ordinarily will modify a 
loan by reducing the interest rate or extending the payment schedule 
only if the result is “net present value positive” for the investor.116 
																																																																																																																																
 110. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 111. See infra Table 1, Table 2. 
 112. See generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 113. Banks Pay Borrower Bonuses to Avoid Foreclosures, NUWIRE (July 14, 2011), 
http://www.nuwireinvestor.com/banks-pay-borrower-bonuses-to-avoid-foreclosures/. 
 114. MORTG. BANKERS ASS’N, LENDER’S COST OF FORECLOSURE 2, 4–5 (2008), 
http://www.sandiegohousingsolutions.com/MortgageBankersAssocationLenderCosttoForecloseCongres
sionalBriefing.pdf. 
 115. Alan M. White, Deleveraging the American Homeowner: The Failure of 2008 Voluntary 
Mortgage Contract Modifications, 41 CONN. L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2009). 
 116. Amy Loftsgordon, Net Present Value (NPV) and Your Mortgage Loan Modification, ALLLAW, 
http://www.alllaw.com/articles/nolo/foreclosure/net-present-value-npv-mortgage-loan-
modification.html (last visited Aug. 24, 2016). 
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This means that the expected cash flow from the modified loan, 
accounting for the probability of another default and any reduction in 
interest or principal, is greater than the expected cash flow from not 
modifying the loan, accounting for the probability of a completed 
foreclosure sale and the expected loss.117 The net present value of a 
successful modification will almost invariably exceed the modest 
cost of mediation.118  The average net present value for approved 
permanent modifications under the federal HAMP program was 
around $20,000.119 
The economic benefits of preventing a foreclosure sale extend far 
beyond the savings to banks and other mortgage investors.120 First 
and foremost, a family avoids losing a home.121 A foreclosure sale 
and forced relocation can mean the disruption of neighborhood and 
social ties, children’s education, and families’ mental stability.122 
Foreclosure sales also have a uniquely harmful effect on 
neighborhoods and communities. 123  Property abandonment and 
blight, and the depressing effect of concentrated distress sales on 
home prices, sap the wealth of the impacted communities, which are 
often low-income communities of color. 124  Cities and towns 
experiencing large numbers of foreclosure sales face mounting costs 
for policing, demolition, and lost tax revenue. 125  The cumulative 
costs of even a single foreclosure sale may far exceed the entire 
amount of a typical $200,000 mortgage loan. 126  If foreclosure 
																																																																																																																																
 117. Alexandra Andrews & Emily Witt, The Secret Test that Ensures Lenders Win on Loan Mods, 
PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2009 2:18 PM), http://www.propublica.org/article/the-secret-test-that-ensures-
lenders-win-on-loan-mods-915. 
 118. Author’s calculations using data from Making Home Affordable Data File, U.S. DEP’T OF 
TREAS., http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Pages/mha_publicfile.aspx 
(calculations on file with author). 
 119. Id. 
 120. Banks Pay Borrower, supra note 113. 
 121. DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, DEREGULATION, AND THE 
UNDERMINING OF AMERICA’S MORTGAGE MARKET 145–47 (2009). 
 122. Id. at 149–52. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. 
 125. Id. at 152. 
 126. See id. 
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mediation is even modestly successful in preventing foreclosure 
sales, the benefits should easily outweigh the costs. 
III. COSTS AND DELAYS CAUSED BY MEDIATION AND DIVERSION 
PROGRAMS ARE MODEST 
Foreclosure mediation and diversion programs impose two 
categories of costs. The direct costs for the personnel administering 
and conducting the mediation sessions are relatively modest, as are 
the incremental cost to the servicer and its attorneys.127 Of greater 
concern are the indirect costs that result from delaying foreclosure in 
order to conduct mediation.128  Evidence from the past five years 
strongly suggests that long foreclosure delays are not primarily the 
result of mediation programs, and that the marginal delay for 
well-run mediation programs imposes costs that are also modest, 
particularly when compared to the benefits of successful 
mediation.129 
A. The Costs of Existing Mediation Programs Are Modest, Paid 
Either by Users or State Appropriations 
Statewide foreclosure mediation and diversion programs are 
funded through state appropriations, fees charged to the lender or 
homeowner when mediation is scheduled, or foreclosure filing 
fees.130 Delaware charges a $300 mediation fee to the foreclosure 
plaintiff. 131  The District of Columbia charges a $300 fee to the 
foreclosing lender, a $50 fee to the homeowner, and funds the 
program with noncompliance fines. 132  Hawaii charges $300, and 
Nevada charges $200 to each party.133 
																																																																																																																																
 127. See discussion infra Section III.A. 
 128. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 129. See discussion infra Section III.B. 
 130. See generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 131. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 5062C(e)(3) (West 2013); Automatic Residential Mortgage 
Foreclosure Mediation Program, No. 2013-2 (Del. Super. Ct. May 28, 2013). 
 132. D.C. Code § 42-815.03 (2010); 57 D.C. Reg. 12408, 12410 (Dec. 31, 2010). 
 133. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2014, supra note 55, at 1; WALSH, supra note 34, at 36. 
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Connecticut’s statewide program is run by the judiciary and 
employs twenty-five full-time mediators.134 Connecticut’s legislature 
elected to fund the program from general revenues, appropriating $2 
million in the program’s first year (2008). 135  As noted earlier, 
Connecticut’s program served more than 30,000 homeowners 
between 2008 and 2013, more than 5,000 per year, meaning the cost 
per mediation was roughly $400.136 Washington State combined two 
funding mechanisms.137 It imposed a $250 fee on each filed notice of 
a nonjudicial foreclosure sale.138 This filing fee approach yielded $15 
million over a three-year period, and those funds were used for 
program administration, housing counseling, and other related 
services. 139  Washington also charges each party $200 and the 
mediator receives a mediation fee of $400.140 
The Boston Federal Reserve’s foreclosure mediation study 
canvassed the different funding strategies used in various New 
England mediation programs, 141  and Resolution Systems, Inc. 
provides a summary of foreclosure mediation funding approaches on 
its website.142 The costs of foreclosure mediation are quite modest, 
whether funded by user fees for lenders and homeowners or by state 
appropriations. 
																																																																																																																																
 134. GONG & BRINTON, supra note 84, at 13. 
 135. 2008 Conn. Acts 08-176 § 20 (Reg. Sess.). The Connecticut General Assembly’s Office of Fiscal 
Analysis estimated the program’s cost for FY 2014 as $5.5 million. An Act Extending the Foreclosure 
Mediation Program, H.B. 6419, Fiscal Note, OFF. OF FISCAL ANALYSIS, 
https://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/FN/2013HB-06419-R000214-FN.htm (last visited Aug. 25, 2016). 
 136. See GONG & BRINTON, supra note 84, at 4. 
 137. See infra notes 138, 140. 
 138. WASH. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FORECLOSURE FAIRNESS PROGRAM: ANNUAL REPORT ON 
PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 4 (2014), http://classic.commerce.wa.gov/Documents/Commerce-
Foreclosure-Fairness-2014.pdf. 
 139. Id. at 5. 
 140. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.163(17) (LexisNexis 2016); WASH. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 
FORECLOSURE FAIRNESS GUIDELINES 26 (2015). 
 141. CLIFFORD, supra note 57, at 4. 
 142. HEATHER SCHEIWE KULP, RESOL. SYS. INST., FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAMS FUNDING 
1–16 (2011), http://aboutrsi.org/pfimages/ForeclosureMediationFunding.pdf. 
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B. Mediation Need Not Significantly Delay Foreclosures 
By design, mediation programs delay the judicial or nonjudicial 
foreclosure process to permit parties to exchange information and 
meet with a mediator.143 Foreclosure delays impose costs on lenders 
and borrowers.144 Unpaid interest continues to accrue, and mortgage 
servicers advance funds for property inspections and maintenance, 
attorney’s fees, insurance, and taxes, if the homeowner is not 
paying.145 If the mediation succeeds, these costs may be added to the 
debt or may be written off, depending on the terms of the workout, 
loan modification, or short sale. 146  If the mediation fails, these 
amounts are added to the debt, and in all probability, to the investor 
loss at the foreclosure sale.147 One might think that scheduling and 
holding a mediation session could be accomplished in thirty to sixty 
days, but in practice foreclosure mediations between 2008 and 2012 
took much longer.148 
During the same 2008 to 2012 period, overall foreclosure 
timelines—the time elapsed between referral for foreclosure and the 
completed sale and liquidation of a foreclosed home—grew 
dramatically. 149  By 2011, in New York, the average foreclosure 
reportedly took 820 days to complete.150 Similarly unusual delays 
were reported in many other states, including Connecticut, Florida, 
Illinois, and New Jersey.151 The reasons for the foreclosure delays are 
numerous and interrelated. 152  These unprecedented foreclosure 
																																																																																																																																
 143. Larry Cordell & Lauren Lambie-Hanson, A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Judicial Foreclosure Delay 
and a Preliminary Look at New Mortgage Servicing Rules 2 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working 
Paper No. 15-14, 2015), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
papers/2015/. 
 144. Id. at 7–8, 11–12. 
 145. Id. at 8; Larry Cordell et al., The Cost of Delay 13 (Fed. Reserve Bank of Phila., Working Paper 
No. 13-15, 2013), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/publications/working-
papers/2013/. 
 146. Cordell, supra note 145, at 13–15 
 147. Id. 
 148. See N.Y. COURTS REPORT, supra note 58, at 2 (noting that cases often require four to eight 
settlement conferences to be resolved); see also infra notes 163–69 (reporting on New York, 
Connecticut, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey delays). 
 149. Cordell & Lambie-Hanson, supra note 143, at 2–3. 
 150. State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,993. 
 151. Id. at 58,991. 
 152. See infra text accompanying notes 153–156. 
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delays coincided with the advent of foreclosure mediation programs, 
but also coincided with (1) other federal and state programs to 
mitigate the crisis and (2) the robo-signing scandal—the discovery of 
widespread assembly-line signing of foreclosure affidavits with false 
or unverified statements and improper notary practices for note and 
mortgage assignments.153  Other factors contributing to foreclosure 
delays included (1) widespread mortgage servicer failures and 
incompetence, as reported by banking regulators, 154  (2) the 
abandoned foreclosure phenomenon—large numbers of foreclosures 
started and then dropped by servicers,155 and (3) lenders’ failures to 
dispose of foreclosed properties in the face of a historic plunge in 
home prices.156 
States with mediation programs experienced significant and—in a 
few cases—extreme delays in completing mortgage foreclosures; 
however, according to the available evidence, mediation programs 
were not the primary cause of those delays.157  Some evidence is 
available on the impact that mediation programs, as distinct from 
other state law changes and non-legal factors, have had on 
foreclosure timelines. 158  Somewhat simplistic analyses have been 
offered on both sides of the debate. On one hand, advocates point out 
that mediations can speed up the loss-mitigation process by focusing 
the parties’ attention, accelerating information exchange, and getting 
																																																																																																																																
 153. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-433, MORTGAGE FORECLOSURES: 
DOCUMENTATION PROBLEMS REVEAL NEED FOR ONGOING REGULATORY OVERSIGHT 8 (2011), 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/320/317923.pdf; CONG. OVERSIGHT PANEL, 61-835, EXAMINING THE 
CONSEQUENCES OF MORTGAGE IRREGULARITIES FOR FINANCIAL STABILITY AND FORECLOSURE 
MITIGATION 1, 34, 36 (2010), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-111JPRT61835/pdf/CPRT-
111JPRT61835.pdf; OFF. OF THRIFT SUPERVISION, FED. RESERVE SYS., INTERAGENCY REVIEW OF 
FORECLOSURE POLICIES AND PRACTICES 3 (2011), 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/rptcongress/interagency_review_foreclosures_20110413.pdf. 
 154. Clifford J. White III & Ramona D. Elliot, $25 Billion Mortgage Servicer Settlement—
Implications for the United States Trustee Program and the Bankruptcy System, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 
18, 18 (2012). 
 155. Judith Fox, How to Kill a Zombie: Strategies for Dealing with the Aftermath of the Foreclosure 
Crisis 7–8 (Notre Dame Law Sch. Legal Studies Research, Paper No. 1519, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2622507. 
 156. See Daniel Immergluck, The Accumulation of Lender-Owned Homes During the U.S. Mortgage 
Crisis: Examining Metropolitan REO Inventories, 20 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 547, 619 (2010). 
 157. Judith Fox, The Future of Foreclosure Law in the Wake of the Great Housing Crisis of 2007-
2014, 54 WASHBURN L.J. 489, 515 (2014); GONG & BRINTON, supra note 84, at 33. 
 158. Gong & Brinton, supra note 84, at 33. 
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to a definitive answer.159 On the other hand, opponents assume that 
the mediation process is added to existing timelines, and in the case 
of unsuccessful mediation, needlessly increases delay.160 
The Connecticut study found that participation in mediation 
extended the time in foreclosure by an average of 255 days. 161 
However, the study also found that in cases where the plaintiff 
(mortgage servicer) complied fully and promptly with program rules, 
cases took only thirty days longer than non-mediated cases.162 The 
Connecticut mediation program data includes questions about the 
servicer and the homeowner’s participation, including whether they 
attended conferences, requested delays, were prepared with necessary 
documents, and had authority to settle.163 The study also found that 
two large mortgage servicers were consistently the least prepared, 
and contributed significantly to average foreclosure delays. 164  A 
more recent Connecticut report notes that homeowners furnish 
required forms and documentation before the first meeting in 71% of 
cases, while servicers furnished required forms and documentation in 
49% of cases.165 The Philadelphia study found the mean time spent in 
the mediation diversion program was fifty-four days.166 
Mediation programs per se contributed much less to foreclosure 
delays than servicer capacity problems combined with the 
robo-signing crisis’s aftermath; the continuing inability of servicers 
and foreclosure attorneys to verify basic elements in foreclosure 
pleadings such as the amounts due and the parties’ identities; and the 
large number of contested cases.167 Additionally, while the unusual 
																																																																																																																																
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. at 25. 
 161. Id. at 24. 
 162. Id. at 30. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Gong & Brinton, supra note 84, at 31. 
 165. CONN. CHIEF COURT ADM’R, FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE BANKS 
COMMITTEE OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY 16–17 (2015) [hereinafter CONN. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 
PROGRAM]. 
 166. THE REINVESTMENT FUND, supra note 77, at 23. 
 167. Memorandum from Alan White to the Unif. Law Comm’n Comm. on Home Foreclosure 
Procedures Act, Foreclosure Delays in Judicial Foreclosure States (Feb. 11, 2013), 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/shared/docs/Residential%20Real%20Estate%20Mortgage%20Foreclosure
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delays may not be primarily a function of permanent state foreclosure 
laws or court rules, they have been affected by temporary court 
measures. 168  Atypically long foreclosure delays in many states 
characterized the period from the fall of 2010, when the robo-signing 
scandal gained nationwide attention, through the end of 2012, when 
various state and federal reviews of foreclosure processes began 
winding down.169 
Factors that seem to vary among states include: state court efforts 
to correct robo-signing errors and fraud; servicers deciding not to add 
real estate owned (REO) inventory in certain areas; and the time 
needed to submit and act on borrower requests for modifications and 
other foreclosure alternatives. 170  The following is a detailed 
discussion of the court response to robo-signing in one state (New 
Jersey) and the impact it has had on delays. 
New Jersey is reported by FHFA as having a foreclosure timeline 
of 750 days. 171  The actual average time required for a judicial 
foreclosure case filed calendar year 2012, on the other hand, was 270 
days, according to Kevin Wolfe, Assistant Director, Civil Practice 
Division, New Jersey Administrative Office of the Courts.172 The 
750-day figure is largely a result of fallout from the robo-signing 
crisis in 2010 and 2011. 173  In December 2010 the New Jersey 
Supreme Court amended its court rules to require foreclosure 
plaintiffs to file a Certificate of Diligent Inquiry (CODI).174 Similar 
																																																																																																																																
Foreclosure Delays Memo]. The discussion of foreclosure delays contained within the remainder of Part 
III is derived from this Memorandum. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. Streitfeld, supra note 18; see also Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167. 
 171. State-Level Guarantee Fee Pricing, 77 Fed. Reg. at 58,993. 
 172. Prevost, supra note 18. Note that the time from court filing through completed foreclosure sale 
would not include the period between referral for foreclosure and the initial filing, a period that would 
be included in the FHFA measure. 
 173. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167. 
 174. N.J. SUP. CT. R. 1:5-6(c)(1)(E); N.J. SUP. CT. R. 4:64-1(a)(2). The December 20, 2010, 
amendments to N.J. Rule 1:5-6(c)(1)(E) and Rules 4:64-1(a)(2) and (3) require that plaintiffs’ attorneys 
affix to foreclosure complaints a certification of diligent inquiry as to the accuracy of foreclosure 
documents and factual assertions, specifically, (1) that the attorney has communicated with employee(s) 
of the plaintiff who (a) personally reviewed the documents being submitted and (b) confirmed their 
accuracy, (2) the name(s), title(s) and responsibilities in those titles of the plaintiff’s employee(s) with 
whom the attorney communicated, and (3) that the complaint and all annexed documents comport with 
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to the New York attorney affirmation, 175  the CODI called for 
servicers’ attorneys to confirm the accuracy of the allegations in, and 
the documents attached to, their foreclosure complaints. 176 
Foreclosure attorneys in both states were reluctant to certify the 
accuracy of their clients’ foreclosure pleadings, leaving many 
pending foreclosure cases in limbo.177 The resulting backlog of 2010 
and 2011 cases greatly increased the average foreclosure timelines 
for New York and New Jersey.178 
In addition, on December, 20, 2010, the New Jersey courts issued 
show cause orders demanding why uncontested foreclosures by the 
six largest mortgage servicers should not be suspended.179 This led to 
a March 2011 appointment of a special master to review the servicer 
procedures, 180  and, finally, in August 2011, a series of special 
master’s reports that permitted uncontested foreclosures to 
proceed.181 The servicers voluntarily ceased prosecuting all pending 
foreclosures during this court proceeding.182 
The discovery that notices of intent to foreclose sent prior to 2010 
regularly violated New Jersey’s Fair Foreclosure Act further 
complicated the situation. 183  The New Jersey law requires that a 
notice of intent to foreclose identify both the mortgage owner and the 
servicer.184 Servicers had developed a routine practice of identifying 
																																																																																																																																
the provisions of Rule 1:4-8(a). N.J. SUP. CT. R. 1:5-6(c)(1)(E); N.J. SUP. CT. R. 4:64-1(a)(2)-(3). 
 175. Andrew Keshner, New Court Rule Says Attorneys Must Verify Foreclosure Papers, N.Y. L.J., 
Oct. 21, 2010, at 1. 
 176. N.J. SUP. CT. R. 4:64-1(a)(2)-(3). 
 177. See Streitfeld, supra note 18. 
 178. See id. 
 179. In re Residential Mortg. Foreclosure Pleading and Document Irregularities, No. F-059553-10 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Dec. 20, 2010), http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/notices/2010/n101220c.pdf 
(order directing the named foreclosure plaintiffs to show cause). 
 180. In re Residential Mortg. Foreclosure Pleading and Document Irregularities, No. F-059553-10 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Mar. 29, 2011), 
http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/superior/order_approving_stipulation.pdf (order approving the 
recommended stipulation and appointing special master). 
 181. See In re Residential Mortgage Foreclosure Pleading and Document Irregularities, N.J. 
COURTS, http://www.judiciary.state.nj.us/superior/f_59553_10.html (last visited Sept. 2, 2016) (listing 
the Special Master’s reports and orders). 
 182. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167. 
 183. Id. at 3. 
 184. Fair Foreclosure Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-56(c)(11)(West 2016). 
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only the servicer and not the loan owner.185 The New Jersey Supreme 
Court decided in the Guillaume case that pending foreclosures with 
defective notices need not be dismissed, but that courts could direct 
the plaintiff to serve a corrected notice of intent.186 Servicers then 
re-sent tens of thousands of notices in foreclosure cases that were 
filed prior to 2012 in order to comply with New Jersey law.187 
Legal services advocates in New Jersey maintain that servicers 
were responsible for the delays.188 They argue that servicers could 
have responded much more promptly to the December 2010 court 
actions, and could have resumed foreclosures in early 2011, either by 
promptly sending corrected notices of intent and filing certifications 
of diligent inquiry in support of foreclosure documents, or dismissing 
and refiling pending cases.189 A motion by legal services to reduce 
the interest charged on all mortgages involved in delayed, 
uncontested foreclosures was recently rejected by the Superior 
Court.190 
New York and Illinois judges also took action to stay foreclosures 
and review robo-signing defects.191 In nonjudicial states, courts were 
not directly affected by robo-signing.192 As a result, there have not 
been court initiatives in those states to delay foreclosures in order to 
correct affidavits or insure that foreclosures are otherwise properly 
documented. 193  The April 2012 national settlement among state 
attorneys general, the Department of Justice, and five major servicers 
																																																																																																																																
 185. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167, at 3. 
 186. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Guillaume, 38 A.3d 570, 574 (N.J. 2012). 
 187. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167, at 3. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. Id.; In re Application of Wells Fargo Bank NA to Issue Corrected Notices of Intent to Foreclose 
on Behalf of Identified Foreclosure Plaintiffs in Uncontested Cases, No. F9564-12 (N.J. Super. Ct. Jan. 
7, 2013). 
 191. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167, at 3; Mary Ellen Podmolik, Altered Documents halt 
Some Cook County Foreclosures, CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2011), http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2011-
03-25/business/ct-biz-0326-altered-foreclosures-20110325_1_foreclosure-affidavits-foreclosure-
procedures-foreclosure-pipeline. 
 192. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167, at 3. 
 193. See, e.g., Purva Patel, Nancy Sarnoff, & Jennifer Hiller, Foreclosures Go Forward Despite 
Texas AG’s Moratorium Push, HOUS. CHRON. (Oct. 5, 2010, 5:30 AM), 
http://www.chron.com/business/real-estate/article/Foreclosures-go-forward-despite-Texas-AG-s-
1698374.php. 
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did not require any corrective action for pending foreclosures; the 
measures to correct the robo-signing problem were prospective 
only.194 As a result, each state was left to decide what, if any, action 
should be taken to review pending or recently completed 
foreclosures.195 
The states’ varying approaches to remedying robo-signing help 
explain interstate variation in foreclosure timelines from 2010 to 
2012. 196  Mediation’s small contribution to delay was primarily 
caused by servicers’ tardiness in producing information and the 
consideration of loss mitigation alternatives.197 Effective mediation 
need not impose extensive delays. 198  The cost of a few hundred 
dollars and two or three months’ delay is far outweighed by the 
thousands of dollars lenders, homeowners, and communities save in a 
successful foreclosure mediation.199 
IV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION REQUIRES COURT ENFORCEMENT AND 
SOME MEDIATOR REPORTING NOT FOUND IN CONVENTIONAL 
MEDIATION, BUT AN ENFORCEABLE DUTY TO MEDIATE NEED NOT 
DEPEND ON A PROBLEMATIC GOOD FAITH STANDARD 
A. Foreclosure Mediation Is Different 
Foreclosure mediation yields greater societal benefits than 
mediation in other civil disputes, and it helps to break through an 
agency problem unique to the mortgage industry. In other civil 
litigation, the societal interest in encouraging mediation is mostly to 
unburden the courts.200 Successful foreclosure mediation, however, 
																																																																																																																																
 194. See, e.g., U.S. v. Bank of America, Corp., No. 12-0361, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188892 (D.D.C. 
Apr. 4, 2012). The February 9, 2012, settlement agreements between the federal government, 49 states, 
and the various bank servicers are available on the settlement monitor’s web site. About the National 
Mortgage Settlement, JASMITHMONITORING.COM, https://www.jasmithmonitoring.com/omso/about-
the-national-mortgage-settlement/ (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 195. Foreclosure Delays Memo, supra note 167, at 3–4. 
 196. Id. at 4. 
 197. See id. at 3. 
 198. Kenneth R. Feinberg, Mediation—A Preferred Method of Dispute Resolution, 16 PEPP. L. REV. 
5, 10 (1989). 
 199. See id. 
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has many positive externalities. For the reasons discussed above: 
families remain in their homes, housing markets are improved, and 
local governments avoid the costs of property vacancy.201 Thus, there 
is a stronger social policy interest in imposing mediation even on 
reluctant mortgage servicers; an interest that is absent in ordinary 
civil mediation, where respecting party autonomy plays a greater 
role. 
The interests of mortgage servicers, who actually conduct 
foreclosure cases, are not well aligned with the lenders and investors 
whose economic interests are at stake in the mortgage loan. 202 
Servicers benefit economically from loan defaults and foreclosures 
even if their principals do not.203  In particular, mortgage servicer 
compensation structures incentivize servicers not to negotiate loan 
modifications that are net present value positive for the mortgage 
investor.204 Servicers make the most money when they either collect 
on-time payments, or foreclose and sell homes quickly. 205  The 
staffing and training required to implement good loan modifications 
and other workouts are unprofitable for servicers. 206  Mediation, 
therefore, can play an important role in overcoming this structural 
barrier by compelling servicers to fully evaluate foreclosure 
alternatives. 
The effectiveness of foreclosure mediation and diversion programs 
is partly attributable to the programs’ success in prodding mortgage 
servicers to fully evaluate loan modification, short sales, and other 
alternatives before proceeding to a foreclosure sale.207 The programs 
compel the homeowner to submit necessary financial information, 
																																																																																																																																
mediation/29/what-is-mediation- (last visited Nov. 5, 2016). 
 201. See supra Part II. 
 202. Kurt Eggert, Limiting Abuse and Opportunism by Mortgage Servicers, 15 HOUSING POL’Y 
DEBATE 753, 769, 771 (2004); Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON 
REG. 1, 5 (2011). 
 203. Levitin & Twomey, supra note 202, at 5. 
 204. Id. at 1; Patricia A. McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 
ARIZ. L. REV. 723, 756 (2013). 
 205. DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY 
SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR: SERVICER COMPENSATION AND ITS 
CONSEQUENCES (2009), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf. 
 206. Id. at vii. 
 207. WALSH, supra note 34, at 11. 
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and compel the servicer to specify what information it needs; to 
identify all available loss mitigation programs; decide whether the 
homeowner is eligible for any of them, and justify its decision.208 
This combination of information exchange and compelled attention is 
key to the programs’ success.209 
In judicial foreclosure states, the court will prevent servicers from 
obtaining a judgment if they fail to persuade the court mediator or 
facilitator that a homeowner’s case has been thoroughly evaluated, or 
will deny them permission to proceed with a nonjudicial sale.210 
Increasingly, courts have imposed significant sanctions on mortgage 
servicers for failing to comply with mediation program requirements, 
including failing to negotiate in good faith.211 In addition to denying 
servicers the right to foreclose, courts have relieved homeowners of 
interest payments due during servicer delays and, in extreme cases, 
permanently prohibited foreclosure.212 
These court-imposed repercussions conflict with accepted 
principles of mediation. To preserve their neutrality and the 
confidentiality of mediation, mediators normally do not assess the 
negotiating parties’ good faith or quality of participation, nor do they 
report what happened, other than whether an agreement was 
reached.213 However, program rules require foreclosure mediators to 
provide detailed reports on the compliance of servicers and 
homeowners. 214  Nevertheless, an effective foreclosure resolution 
program is possible which both preserves confidentiality and the 
																																																																																																																																
 208. Id. at 17–18. 
 209. Collins & Urban, supra note 80, at 1734–35; Schneider & Fleury, supra note 69, at 377–79. 
 210. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 49-31l(b)(6) (West 2015); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 107.086(2)(d) (West 2015). 
 211. See infra Part IV.C. 
 212. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Sawyer, 95 A.3d 608, 612 (Me. 2014) (dismissing complaint with 
prejudice); U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Williams, 121 A.D.3d 1098, 1102 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014) 
(approving the denial of interest to lender during servicer’s failure to negotiate in good faith). But see 
IndyMac Bank, F.S.B. v. Yano-Horoski, 78 A.D.3d 895, 896 (N.Y. App. Div. 2010) (holding that 
dismissing foreclosure was appropriate but cancellation of the mortgage debt was not an allowable 
sanction). 
 213. MODEL STANDARD OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS Standard V(A)(2) (AM. BAR ASS’N 2005) (“A 
mediator should not communicate to any non-participant information about how the parties acted in the 
mediation. A mediator may report, if required, whether parties appeared at a scheduled mediation and 
whether or not the parties reached a resolution.”). 
 214. See infra text accompanying notes 239-41. 
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mediator’s neutrality while enforcing the program’s rules of 
participation and requiring servicers to respond to homeowner loss 
mitigation applications before being allowed to foreclose. 
B. The Uniform Mediation Act Protects Confidentiality and Restricts 
Mediators from Making Reports on Party Behavior 
The Uniform Mediation Act (UMA) has been adopted in twelve 
states: the District of Columbia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, 
Nebraska, New Jersey, Ohio, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, and 
Washington. 215  Seven of these states, the District of Columbia, 
Hawaii, Illinois, New Jersey, Ohio, Vermont, and Washington also 
have existing foreclosure mediation programs.216 The Ohio program 
was intentionally designed to be as consistent as possible with 
UMA. 217  The other UMA states do not seem to have explicitly 
referenced UMA in designing their foreclosure mediation or 
settlement conference programs. 
The primary goal of UMA is to preserve confidentiality of 
mediation discussions. 218  To balance the party autonomy and 
communication privilege, UMA also addresses the integrity and 
impartiality of the process by requiring mediators to disclose 
conflicts of interest. 219  UMA’s conflict of interest provisions are 
consistent with foreclosure mediation and readily applicable.220 The 
policy challenge is how and whether to extend confidentiality and 
privilege protections to foreclosure mediation while permitting 
mediators to make reports needed for judicial oversight.221 
																																																																																																																																
 215. Enactment Status Map, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/Act.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 216. See generally KULP, supra note 30. 
 217. Hagerott, supra note 54, at 903. 
 218. Mediation Act Summary, UNIF. LAW COMM’N, 
http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Mediation%20Act (last visited Aug. 31, 2016). 
 219. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 9 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
 220. See id. 
 221. For an excellent discussion of the tension between the UMA and foreclosure mediation models, 
see Heather Scheiwe Kulp, A Tightrope over Both Your Houses: Ensuring Party Participation and 
Preserving Mediation’s Core Values in Foreclosure Mediation, 14 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 203 (2014) 
[hereinafter Kulp, Tightrope]. 
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Section 7 of UMA prohibits mediators from making any reports to 
a court or agency except to report whether a session was held and 
whether an agreement was reached.222 On the other hand, existing 
foreclosure mediation programs require the mediation agency to 
determine whether mediation should continue, or if the parties have 
reached an impasse such that foreclosure should proceed.223 
A mediator governed by UMA must keep mediation 
communications confidential; may not report on the mediation except 
for basic outcomes such as attendance and whether a settlement was 
reached; and is not empowered to impose sanctions, delay or 
accelerate foreclosure, or otherwise twist arms.224 A mediator cannot 
report that a party to the mediation does not have full settlement 
authority or failed to negotiate in good faith, but can report a party’s 
failure to attend.225 On the other hand, a special master or similar 
court-appointed referee may hold on-the-record discussions, report to 
the court on the proceedings, and impel the parties to settle in a 
variety of ways, including imposing sanctions or controlling the 
litigation process.226 
The advantage of confidential UMA mediation is that the parties 
can more freely discuss settlement alternatives.227 Mortgage servicers 
in particular might be less reluctant to make offers that would 
otherwise set precedent for other homeowners, and confidentiality 
should encourage candor and informality. Homeowners and 
mediators in existing foreclosure mediation programs oppose the 
confidential mediation model because it prevents mediators from 
reporting misconduct to the court, recommending sanctions, or 
recommending continuation of the mediation or settlement 
																																																																																																																																
 222. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT § 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2003). 
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conference process.228 Some advocates also see the duty to mediate 
in good faith as critical to the success of foreclosure mediation.229 
C. The Much-Litigated Duty to Mediate in Good Faith Can Be 
Adequately Defined 
At least six states impose a legal duty to participate in good faith 
on parties to foreclosure mediation.230 Proponents assert that a duty 
of good faith is essential to achieve the prodding function that impels 
servicers to offer foreclosure alternatives.231 Opponents argue that a 
general duty of good faith in mediation creates uncertainty and 
unnecessary litigation. 232  Courts in many of these states have 
struggled both to define the duty of good faith and to offer guidance 
to parties and mediators as to what the duty requires.233 
Mediation experts are highly critical of good faith obligations in 
other contexts, particularly when they require or imply that a 
mediator must pass judgment on the parties’ good faith.234 The chief 
objections to a general duty of good faith include: (1) the 
participants, especially financial institutions, are reluctant to 
participate without knowing the contours of the duty and wish to 
preserve the right not to settle, and (2) if mediators must evaluate and 
report on the parties’ good faith they will lose their neutrality, the 
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ALTS. TO HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (2005); Kulp, Tightrope, supra note 221, at 230. 
 233. Hannah Costigan-Cowles, Negotiations for the Home: A Balanced Approach to Good Faith in 
Foreclosure Mediation, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. 1571, 1591 (2013). 
 234. See Roger L. Carter, Oh, Ye of Little (Good) Faith: Questions, Concerns and 
Commentary on Efforts to Regulate Participant Conduct in Mediations, 2002 J. DISP. 
RESOL. 367, 372 (2002); Carol L. Izumi & Homer C. La Rue, Prohibiting Good Faith Reports Under 
the Uniform Mediation Act: Keeping the Adjudication Camel out of the Mediation Tent, 
2003 J. DISP. RESOL. 67, 83 (2003). 
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parties’ trust, and be seen as adjudicators rather than facilitators. 
Most of the cases reported thus far involve breaches of good faith or 
some form of misrepresentation that also amount to clear violations 
of objective program rules.235 These breaches include not providing 
accurate and timely information about loss mitigation programs, and 
not making accurate and timely decisions.236 
Mediators or referees in many state programs file a report with the 
court on the outcome of mediation.237  For example, mediators in 
Connecticut submit detailed reports including answers to the 
following questions: 
1. Did the parties engage in “conduct consistent with the 
goals of the mediation program”? 
2. Did the parties possess the ability to mediate? 
3. Has the mortgagor supplied, on a reasonably timely basis, 
additional information reasonably requested by the 
mortgagee? 
4. Has the mortgagee provided a reasonable explanation of a 
denial for the foreclosure alternative requested? 
5. Has the mortgagee complied with the statutory time frames 
for responding to requests for decisions?238 
Mediators appointed by the Nevada judiciary submit a mediation 
report that details compliance by the mortgage servicer (deed of trust 
beneficiary), homeowner participation, recommendations for 
sanctions, and outcome of the mediation.239 The Washington state 
mediation statute requires homeowners and servicers referred to 
mediation to participate in good faith and makes failure of the lender 
to participate in good faith grounds for the homeowner to obtain an 
injunction of a nonjudicial foreclosure sale. 240  For example, one 
mediator reported in a Washington state case that the servicer failed 
to mediate in good faith because it refused to explain or explore the 
																																																																																																																																
 235. See, e.g., Kulp, Tightrope, supra note 221, at 220. 
 236. Id. 
 237. E.g., Hagerott, supra note 54, at 907. 
 238. CONN. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION PROGRAM, supra note 165, at 48–49. 
 239. NEV. FORECLOSURE MEDIATION 2013, supra note 49, at 2. 
 240. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 61.24.163(14)(a) (West 2014). 
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difference between the opposing parties’ principal and interest 
calculations. 241  Court employed referees to conduct New York’s 
mandatory settlement conferences and make reports and 
recommendations to the court in which the judicial foreclosure is 
pending.242 In all of these programs, the nearly absolute bar in UMA 
on mediator reporting would be an obstacle to the supervision and 
enforcement that these states have found necessary to secure the 
benefits of foreclosure mediation.243 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s new mortgage 
servicing regulations address many of the homeowner advocate 
concerns about servicer misconduct that motivate a broad definition 
of good faith in foreclosure mediations.244 Effective in January 2014, 
the new mortgage servicing rules set clear standards for how and 
when servicers should inform homeowners of available loss 
mitigation programs, request homeowner financial information, and 
act on the homeowner’s application.245 The rule restricts servicers 
from foreclosing until loss mitigation requests have been 
evaluated. 246  The CFPB servicing rules provide a template for 
foreclosure mediation programs to apply in deciding whether a 
servicer has fully explored alternatives to foreclosure, and whether a 
servicer should be permitted to proceed with a foreclosure sale or 
should be sanctioned.247 
New York and Nevada are the two states with the most reported 
cases applying a broad duty to negotiate in good faith. 248  Those 
																																																																																																																																
 241. Wheeler v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., No. C14-117RSL, 2014 WL 442575, at *3 (W.D. 
Wash. Feb. 4, 2014) (denying injunction of nonjudicial foreclosure sale because homeowner had not 
tendered monthly payments due, but holding that homeowner was likely to prevail on the merits due to 
mediator’s report); see also, e.g., Krusee v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. C13-824 RSM, 2013 WL 3973966, 
at *3 (W.D. Wash. July 30, 2013) (finding that servicer’s alleged failure to bring required information to 
mediation and consequent delays could amount to failure to participate in good faith). 
 242. See N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3408(i) (McKinney 2013); HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. McKenna, 952 
N.Y.S.2d 746, 748 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 243. Kulp, Tightrope, supra note 221, at 208–09. 
 244. Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act, 78 Fed. Reg. at 
10,730, 10,739. 
 245. Id. at 10,708, 10,742. 
 246. Id. at 10,698. 
 247. Id. at 10,696. 
 248. See Costigan-Cowles, supra note 233, at 1572. 
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state’s decisions reveal that in virtually all cases, servicer misconduct 
can be tied either to violations of specific program requirements, 
such as timely participation, timely action on, and accurate 
communication regarding homeowner loss mitigation applications, or 
to some type of misrepresentation.249 In virtually all of the New York 
and Nevada cases, when servicers are sanctioned for violating the 
duty of good faith, the conduct at issue violated clear rules of the 
mediation program, or would violate the federal mortgage servicing 
rules now in effect, or both.250 
The New York referees and courts have invoked the duty of good 
faith in the face of various servicer delays and refusals to consider 
loss mitigation alternatives.251 Courts have found good faith lacking 
when a lender refused to approve a short sale at what appeared to be 
the current market value,252 and when a lender failed to review a 
modification request promptly, and gave inconsistent and invalid 
reasons for denying it.253 A servicer violated the duty of good faith 
when they flatly refused to consider any loan modification or short 
sale and gave widely inconsistent statements of the amount due,254 as 
was a servicer who repeatedly asked the homeowner for the same 
documents and delayed deciding the loss mitigation application.255 
One Appellate Division panel described lack of good faith as 
including the following conduct: failure to expeditiously review 
submitted financial information, sending inconsistent and 
contradictory communications, denying requests for a loan 
modification without adequate grounds, and failure of the 
homeowner to provide requested financial information or providing 
incomplete or misleading financial information. 256  Other servicer 
																																																																																																																																
 249. Id. at 1597–1602. 
 250. See id. at 1611–13. 
 251. GEOFF WALSH, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FORECLOSURE 
MEDIATION 1–2 (2011), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/mediation/rpt-
mediation-2011.pdf. 
 252. HSBC Bank USA, N.A. v. McKenna, 952 N.Y.S.2d 746, 764–65 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012). 
 253. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Sarmiento, 991 N.Y.S.2d 68, 79–80 (N.Y. App. Div. 2014). 
 254. IndyMac Bank v. Yano-Horoski, 890 N.Y.S.2d 313, 316 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2009), reversed on other 
grounds, 912 N.Y.S.2d 239 (2010). 
 255. U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Thomas, 977 N.Y.S.2d 670, 670 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). 
 256. Sarmiento, 991 N.Y.S.2d at 79–80. 
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misconduct cited as failure to negotiate in good faith included refusal 
to honor agreements made before or during mediation,257 and refusal 
to implement a signed modification agreement for five months 
because of a non-material notarization problem, combined with 
failure to account for payments made under a temporary agreement 
and making misrepresentations to the homeowner and the court.258 
The Nevada Supreme Court found in Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA 
that sanctions were warranted when a servicer failed to have a person 
with authority to modify the mortgage available, and failed to 
produce required documents including the mortgage note and an 
appraisal of the home.259 Although the mediator in that case also 
opined that the servicer had failed to negotiate in good faith, that 
finding was unnecessary to the court’s decision to sanction the 
servicer and delay the foreclosure.260 The court listed four statutory 
requirements for mediation participants: to attend, to participate in 
good faith, to bring required documents, and to have authority or 
access to a person with authority to settle.261 The servicer violated 
three of these four requirements.262 Other Nevada cases have also 
resulted in sanctions because servicers failed to bring required 
documents or failed to have a person with appropriate negotiating 
authority available.263 
Some of the servicer misconduct cited as violating the duty of 
good faith amounts to misrepresentation, whether deliberate or 
unintentional. For example, homeowners assert that some servicers 
misrepresent the result of their net present value calculations to deny 
meritorious loan modification requests.264 A duty of good faith, in 
																																																																																																																																
 257. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Meyers, 966 N.Y.S.2d 108, 113 (N.Y. App. Div. 2013). 
 258. Citimortgage, Inc. v. Sultan, 6 N.Y.S.3d 393, 407–08, 415, 425–26 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014), 
vacated, 2015 WL 4919899 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
 259. Pasillas v. HSBC Bank USA, 255 P.3d 1281, 1285, 1287 (Nev. 2011). 
 260. Id. at 1286–87. 
 261. Id. at 1284. 
 262. Id. at 1285. 
 263. Wells Fargo Bank v. Renslow, No. 58283, 2015 WL 3368883, at *5–6 (Nev. May 21, 2015); 
Latham v. Aurora Loan Servs., LLC, No. 60353, 2014 WL 495270, at *2–3 (Nev. Jan. 24, 2014); 
Jacinto v. PennyMac Corp., 300 P.3d 724, 727 (Nev. 2013). 
 264. Costigan-Cowles supra note 233, at 1590. 
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these cases, really means a duty not to misrepresent material 
information to the mediator or the other party. 
It would rarely have been necessary for a mediator to make a 
subjective judgment about good faith in these cases. The mediator 
report needs to cover more than attendance and outcome; it should 
include objective facts that do not undermine the impartiality of the 
mediator or the confidentiality of the process. For example, if 
mediation agency rules require the servicer to respond to a completed 
homeowner application for loss mitigation within the time specified 
in the CFPB regulations—30 days, ordinarily—the report could 
include the dates when a completed application was submitted and 
whether the servicer made and communicated a timely decision. 
Indeed, mediator reports can track the parties’ compliance with each 
step of information exchange and servicer action on applications so 
that the conduct can be measured against the federal regulations and 
the mediation program rules. 
A well-designed foreclosure mediation program ought to have 
clear rules for homeowners to appear, provide required information, 
and respond to any offers of loss mitigation by the servicer. 
Similarly, the rules should require the servicer to appear, to have the 
ability to specify definitively what information is needed from the 
homeowner, to evaluate the information, and to make and truthfully 
explain its decisions, based on correct information and in compliance 
with CFPB rules. 265  Mediators can then report to a court or 
supervising agency whether parties complied with these objective 
conduct standards, rather than having to answer subjective questions 
such as whether the parties negotiated in good faith or complied with 
the spirit of the program. Principles of mediator impartiality, as well 
as the need for both parties to have confidence in the mediation 
system, can be preserved while fully policing misconduct that results 
in needless foreclosures. 
 
																																																																																																																																
 265. Kulp, Tightrope, supra note 221, at 218–21 (identifying accountability principles for mediation 
participants). 
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D. The Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act Incorporates 
Mandatory Mediation with a Robust Duty to Participate 
The Uniform Home Foreclosure Procedures Act project was 
launched in 2012, in the midst of the nationwide foreclosure crisis.266 
The drafting committee was charged with addressing a range of 
issues that were being litigated in state courts and debated in state 
legislatures. 267  The HFPA identifies the party with standing to 
foreclose; 268  specifies the content of notices, including the pre-
foreclosure notice of default and the notice of foreclosure sale;269 
describes the homeowners’ right to cure a default and terminate a 
foreclosure;270 spells out the requirements for foreclosure, including 
how to enforce lost notes;271 authorizes a voluntary surrender of the 
property with cancellation of junior liens; 272  permits expedited 
foreclosure of abandoned properties;273 and specifies remedies and 
defenses for homeowners.274 
The HFPA also authorizes permanent and mandatory mediation 
while preserving considerable flexibility for state implementation.275 
The HFPA uses the term “foreclosure resolution” rather than 
“mediation” to highlight the difference between foreclosure 
mediation and classic mediation under the UMA.276 The Uniform 
Law Commission, as author of the UMA, is committed to the 
principles of that Act.277 For example, the HFPA carries over the 
																																																																																																																																
 266. WILLIAM R. BREETZ & BARRY NEKRITZ, THE UNIFORM FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT 
(‘UHFPA’ OR ‘YOU-HUFF-PA’)—NO ONE SEEMS TO LOVE IT (YET) 2 (2014), http://files.ali-
cle.org/thumbs/datastorage/skoob/articles/BKAC1403%20TAB18%20Breetz_Nekritz_thumb. pdf. 
 267. Id. at 1–2. 
 268. UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT § 104 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 269. Id. §§ 201, 405. 
 270. Id. § 203. 
 271. Id. art. 4. 
 272. Id. art. 5. 
 273. Id. art. 6. 
 274. UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT art. 7 (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). Article 7 
includes a provision permitting homeowners to assert certain defenses against subsequent mortgage note 
holders, notwithstanding the holder-in-due-course doctrine of Uniform Commercial Code § 3-305. Id. 
§ 705. 
 275. Id. art. 3. 
 276. Id. § 301 cmt. 3. 
 277. See id. app. 25 
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confidentiality principle.278 Any financial information exchanged by 
the parties in the foreclosure resolution process is privileged and 
protected from discovery in other litigation.279 On the other hand, the 
neutral person conducting foreclosure resolution is not prohibited 
from reporting on the results of the process, and such reports are 
implicitly required. 280  Foreclosure is stayed for ninety days if a 
homeowner requests a meeting, unless the supervising agency 
determines the resolution process should continue for longer or be cut 
short.281 The agency needs information from the neutral person to 
decide whether the parties require additional time for the foreclosure 
resolution process, just as foreclosure mediators in existing programs 
report on parties’ compliance with program rules. 
Unlike states such as New York, the HFPA does not impose an 
explicit duty to mediate in good faith. 282  Instead, it requires the 
foreclosing party and homeowner to attend and participate in the 
resolution process.283 Failure to participate includes not only failing 
to attend, but also failing to exchange required information; failing to 
designate a person with authority to settle; and failure of a creditor or 
servicer to inform the homeowner of available loss mitigation options 
and to consider the homeowner for all appropriate options.284 The 
HFPA requires good faith compliance with all specific statutory 
requirements 285  and prohibits servicers from misrepresenting all 
aspects of foreclosure, including the homeowner’s eligibility for loss 
mitigation.286 Thus, while the Act does not create an unmoored duty 
of good faith, it does prohibit servicer dishonesty in following the 
resolution process rules. These provisions should reach most, if not 
all, of the misconduct that has prompted court findings of servicer 
bad faith in existing foreclosure mediation programs. 
																																																																																																																																
 278. Id. app. 25. 
 279. UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT § 304(f) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 280. Id. app. 22. 
 281. Id. § 305(c). 
 282. Compare UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT § 303(b), with 2009 N.Y. Sess. Laws c. 
507, § 10-a(1) (McKinney). 
 283. UNIF. HOME FORECLOSURE PROCEDURES ACT § 303(b) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2015). 
 284. Id. 
 285. Id. § 105. 
 286. Id. § 106. 
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Although the Act creates a structure for foreclosure resolution and 
addresses some basic policy choices, including its objective 
rules-based approach to the good faith problem, it recognizes the 
variety of resolution and mediation programs that exist and gives 
states the freedom to define the contours and details of their 
programs.287 
CONCLUSION 
At its best, foreclosure mediation removes roadblocks to mutually 
beneficial solutions, including loan modifications, short sales, and 
other alternatives to foreclosure sales and evictions. The evidence 
from the laboratories of democracy is compelling: although 
mediation slows the foreclosure process, it significantly increases the 
likelihood of better outcomes. 288  Foreclosure mediation will thus 
promote housing tenure stability, minimize investor losses, and 
reduce harms to families and communities that otherwise result from 
foreclosure auctions and sales. The Uniform Home Foreclosure 
Procedures Act offers a useful legislative framework to make 
foreclosure mediation permanent. It may be that in the future, 
mortgage-servicing improvements will make the added step of 
foreclosure mediation unnecessary by ensuring that servicers fully 
consider foreclosure alternatives in every case before beginning 
foreclosure. But until that day comes, the case for making mediation 
a permanent feature of state foreclosure laws is compelling.
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 288. See supra Part II. 
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Table 1: outcomes for home mortgages in foreclosure by state 
 
 
Mediation Foreclosed Current Prepaid in 
full 
Active 
Delinquent 
Missing 
Data 
AZ  74.10% 6.10% 8.10% 5.10% 10.40%
NV Y 73.30% 7.60% 5.90% 9.00% 12.30%
MI Y 70.20% 5.00% 4.80% 9.00% 17.30%
MN * 67.20% 8.60% 6.80% 1.30% 14.70%
CA  67.00% 8.90% 7.40% 1.30% 15.40%
MO  65.00% 7.30% 7.20% 2.40% 15.00%
CO * 64.60% 7.40% 10.40% 6.90% 15.10%
VA  62.80% 9.40% 10.20% 5.30% 14.40%
IN Y 62.10% 8.70% 6.20% 9.00% 17.30%
OH Y 62.10% 8.70% 4.70% 2.80% 18.90%
WI  60.20% 10.60% 6.80% 4.90% 17.00%
ID  59.90% 10.60% 11.40% 3.40% 15.10%
KS  59.60% 9.70% 7.60% 7.30% 16.70%
GA  59.30% 9.30% 8.80% 3.00% 17.70%
TN  58.60% 10.10% 7.90% 5.50% 16.00%
NE  58.10% 10.50% 9.20% 5.70% 14.40%
SD  58.10% 9.70% 12.40% 6.50% 15.20%
IA Y 57.30% 10.70% 8.30% 7.50% 16.40%
KY  56.40% 9.70% 7.40% 14.40% 19.00%
WV  56.20% 11.70% 7.50% 5.20% 14.00%
RI Y 55.60% 11.40% 6.00% 6.00% 23.00%
NH  54.80% 10.80% 7.60% 6.80% 22.20%
IL * 54.50% 13.10% 6.20% 2.80% 20.70%
FL * 54.40% 15.30% 5.80% 2.60% 21.60%
OK  54.20% 12.20% 9.20% 5.50% 16.90%
AL  53.30% 8.30% 10.70% 11.00% 18.70%
AR  53.10% 12.40% 9.60% 4.30% 15.80%
TX  53.10% 11.50% 9.60% 7.70% 18.50%
MS  52.80% 11.00% 8.30% 7.50% 17.00%
NC  52.30% 11.00% 9.40% 7.80% 19.70%
WA Y 51.30% 15.40% 12.30% 4.60% 16.60%
SC  51.20% 12.30% 7.90% 8.40% 19.60%
AK  50.50% 12.00% 14.90% 7.80% 17.50%
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OR Y 50.30% 18.40% 11.80% 0.90% 15.80%
UT  50.20% 10.50% 19.10% 10.80% 15.80%
MA  49.90% 13.40% 7.60% 5.60% 23.90%
MD Y 48.20% 19.80% 7.20% 7.50% 18.80%
WY  46.50% 12.70% 17.00% 3.70% 18.40%
MT  45.80% 13.30% 20.20% 11.20% 16.50%
ME Y 45.40% 13.60% 7.00% 3.60% 27.20%
ND  43.30% 16.30% 17.50% 3.90% 15.40%
DE Y 43.10% 19.70% 10.40% 9.00% 17.70%
NM  42.70% 17.30% 13.50% 4.60% 18.70%
LA  42.00% 14.50% 10.40% 7.30% 18.60%
CT Y 41.40% 19.80% 8.30% 7.40% 23.60%
PA * 41.30% 17.60% 8.60% 4.40% 21.20%
DC Y 39.90% 22.10% 11.60% 3.20% 21.00%
HI Y 37.50% 21.40% 9.70% 16.70% 28.00%
NJ Y 30.70% 29.80% 7.90% 7.40% 23.20%
VT Y 29.50% 16.50% 9.60% 4.50% 37.00%
NY Y 26.30% 29.40% 8.90% 5.40% 24.70%
US  58.20% 12.20% 7.60% 4.20% 17.80%
*Mediation only in some counties. 
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Table 2 rate of mortgages in foreclosure being modified 
 
State Modified 
 DE 26.90% 
 CT 25.20% 
 PA 24.90% 
 VT 24.80% 
 LA 24.10% 
 NY 23.30% 
 MD 23.00% 
 AK 22.80% 
 WV 22.30% 
 MS 22.00% 
 WY 21.90% 
 NJ 21.30% 
 NC 21.20% 
 WI 21.20% 
 NH 20.90% 
 TX 20.80% 
 ME 20.50% 
 IL 20.10% 
 NE 20.00% 
 SC 19.80% 
 TN 19.70% 
 IA 19.40% 
 MA 19.40% 
 MT 19.10% 
 AL 18.90% 
 
 
State Modified 
 WA 18.90% 
 AR 18.80% 
 ND 18.80% 
 RI 18.70% 
 DC 18.60% 
 MO 18.60% 
 NM 18.40% 
 OK 18.20% 
 OR 18.20% 
 KS 18.00% 
 GA 17.70% 
 HI 17.60% 
 KY 17.60% 
 UT 17.60% 
 ID 16.50% 
 OH 16.20% 
 MN 15.80% 
 VA 15.80% 
 IN 15.70% 
 CA 15.50% 
 AZ 14.80% 
 FL 14.00% 
 CO 13.90% 
 MI 13.50% 
 NV 12.50% 
US 17.20% 
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